On May 19, 2014, Google announced that it is acquiring containerization and dual persona vendor Divide. Divide's technology is designed to create a security and user interface division between the personal and the enterprise content, applications, and data on a single mobile device. This model meets the goal of separating the highly sensitive work data from the games and other potentially malicious content of a consumer nature. The big question is what is Google going to do now that it owns a technology leading containerizaiton play.
Selling Divide as a standalone solution isn't going to be lucrative enough, in the long term, to make the acquisition worthwhile. It makes a whole lot of sense for Google to embed Divide into the Android operating system. Just as rising tides raise all ships, containerization in Android will help the entire Android ecosystem shed the market perception of a technology that isn't quite yet enterprise appropriate. If this acquisition is any indication, Google has just put some power behind its push into the enterprise market and I don't expect it to subside any time soon.
All enterprises and vendors in the mobile security space should reconsider their future purchases and road maps based on this acquisition. Even if you are creating or buying mobile security technologies that don't play at the application layer, mobile security technologies are inseparably intertwined and this acquisition will have ripple effects that must be considered.
We recently published part 1 of a new series designed to help organizations build resiliency against targeted attacks. In the spirit of Maslow, we designed our Targeted-Attack Hierarchy Of Needs. One factor that significantly drove the tone and direction of this research was Forrester client inquiries and consulting. Many organizations were looking for a malware sandbox to check off their targeted attack/advanced persistent threat/advanced threat protection/insert buzzword needs. Malware analysis has a role in enterprise defense, but focusing exclusively on it is a myopic approach to addressing the problem.
Part 1 of the research is designed to help organizations broaden their perspective and lay the foundation for a resilient security program. Part 2 (currently writing at a non George R.R. Martin pace) will move beyond the basics and address strategies for detecting and responding to advanced adversaries. Here is a preview of the research and the six needs we identified:
If you have implemented or used either application wrapping or containerization technologies, please COMPLETE THIS SURVEY.
Application wrapping versus containerization: Which technology provides better security to an enterprise mobile deployment? What are the use cases for each technology, and which technology has a longer shelf life when it comes to being the de facto standard for enterprise mobile security? Are there times when containerization provides a better user experience than application wrapping? And more simply speaking . . . what the heck is the difference between these two technologies, and which one should you purchase?
In the sport of boxing, "the tale of the tape" is a term used to describe a comparison between two fighters. Typically, this comparison includes physical measurements of each fighter as taken by a tape measure before the bout, thus the term "the tale of the tape." I'm currently conducting research for a "tale of the tape" report between mobile containerization technologies and mobile application wrapping. There has been a significant amount of discussion lately regarding which of these technologies is better suited for enterprise deployment. In order to settle this dispute, I'm going to get out the virtual tape measure and analyze the fighters!
This morning, BlackBerry announced the release of the BlackBerry Z3 Jakarta Edition. This new device is targeting the lower end of the market in Indonesia with lessened technical specifications and a reduced price point. It is unclear if the new device will be successful with the Southeast Asian buyer; however, I don't think it matters much to the US-based enterprise.
In the United States, BlackBerry has lost its hardware brand cachet. Over the last five fiscal quarters, BlackBerry total revenue has decreased by 64% from $2.7B to $976M. If we break out the revenue into separate streams -- hardware, software, and services -- we see that all three segments slowed in that same time period. The hardware revenue stream continues to be the boat anchor that is pulling down the other revenue segment, with a loss of 78%, while the software revenue stream only lost 15%.
It’s no longer just your marketing team that uses social media for business purposes. Employees across the entire organization use social media for personal and professional reasons, leveraging social to drive real business for your company. The opportunities to enhance your brand, deepen customer relationships, and glean new customer insights are all too valuable to ignore -- but the risks are real too.
Moreover, the legal and regulatory landscape is evolving rapidly, complicating the ways in which you can manage social media and the myriad reputational, security, and privacy risks (among others) that expose your organization. To take advantage of these opportunities and still protect your company, you need new tools and technology to do this effectively.
On May 5, 2014, Target announced the resignation of its CEO, Gregg Steinhafel, in large part because of the massive and embarrassing customer data breach that occurred just before the 2013 U.S. holiday season kicked into high gear. After a security breach or incident, the CISO (or whoever is in charge of security) or the CIO, or both, are usually axed. Someone’s head has to roll. But the resignation of the CEO is unusual, and I believe this marks an important turning point in the visibility, prioritization, importance, and funding of information security. It’s an indication of just how much:
Security directly affects the top and bottom line. Early estimates of the cost of Target's 2013 holiday security breach indicate a potential customer churn of 1% to 5%, representing anywhere from $30 million to $150 million in lost net income. Target's stock fell 11% after it disclosed the breach in mid-December, but investors pushed shares up nearly 7% on the news of recovering sales. In February 2014, the company reported a 46% decline in profits due to the security breach.
Poor security will tank your reputation. The last thing Target needed was to be a permanent fixture of the 24-hour news cycle during the holiday season. Sure, like other breached companies, Target’s reputation will likely bounce back but it will take a lot of communication, investment, and other efforts to regain customer trust. The company announced last week that it will spend $100 million to adopt chip-and-PIN technology.
It takes a lot more than a static analysis tool, a web scanning service, and a few paid hackers to make your mobile development lifecycle, team, and eventually, your applications secure. Finding flaws in an individual mobile application is easy (assuming you have the right technical skill set). What is a lot harder is actually stopping the creation of mobile application security flaws in the first place.
To achieve the lofty goal of a truly secure mobile application development program takes a rethinking of how we have traditionally secured our applications in the past. Mobile development brings many changes to enterprise engineering teams including additional new device sensors, privacy impacting behaviors that cross the security chasm between consumer and enterprise isolation, and even faster release cycles on the order of days instead of months. Smaller teams with little to no experience in security are cranking out mobile applications at a fevered pace. The result is an accumulation of security debt that will eventually be paid by the enterprises and consumers that use these applications.
In a research world where we collect data on security technology (and services!) adoption, security spending, workforce attitudes about security, and more, there’s one type of data that I get asked about from Forrester clients in inquiry that makes me pause: breach cost data. I pause not because we don’t have it, but because it’s pretty useless for what S&R pros want to use it for (usually to justify investment). Here’s why:
What we see, and what is publicly available data, is not a complete picture. In fact, it’s often a tiny sliver of the actual costs incurred, or an estimate of a part of the cost that an organization opts to reveal.
What an organization may know or estimate as the cost (assuming they have done a cost analysis, which is also rare), and do not have to share, is typically not shared. After all, they would like to put this behind them as quickly as possible, and not draw further unnecessary attention.
What an organization may believe is an estimate of the cost can change over time as events related to the breach crop up. For example, in the case of the Sony PlayStation Network Platform hack in April 2011, a lot of costs were incurred in the weeks and months following the breach, but they were also getting slapped with fines in 2013 relating to the breach. In other breaches, legal actions and settlements can also draw out over the course of many years.
Fifty organizations representing 95 countries were included in the data set. This included 1,367 confirmed data breaches. By comparison, last year’s report included 19 organizations and 621 confirmed data breaches.
In a significant change, Verizon expanded the analysis beyond breaches to include security incidents. As a result, this year’s dataset has 63,437 incidents. This is a great change, recognizes that incidents are about more than just data exfiltration, and also allows for security incidents like DoS attacks to be included.
The structure of the report itself has also evolved; it is no longer threat overview, actors, actions and so on. One of the drivers for this format change was an astounding discovery. Verizon found that over the past 10 years, 92% of all incidents they analyzed could be described by just nine attack patterns. The 2014 report is structured around these nine attack patterns.
Everyone makes mistakes, but for social media teams, one wrong click can mean catastrophe. @USAirways experienced this yesterday when it responded to a customer complaint on Twitter with a pornographic image, quickly escalating into every social media manager’s worst nightmare.
Not only is this one of the most obscene social media #fails to date, but the marketers operating the airline’s Twitter handle left the post online for close to an hour. In the age of social media, it might as well have remained up there for a decade. Regardless of how or why this happened, this event immediately paints a picture of incompetence at US Airways, as well as the newly merged American Airlines brand.
It also indicates a lack of effective oversight and governance.
While details are still emerging, initial reports indicate that human error was the cause of the errant US Airways tweet, which likely means it was a copy and paste mistake or the image was saved incorrectly and selected from the wrong stream. In any case, basic controls could have prevented this brand disaster:
US Airways could have built a process where all outgoing posts that contain an image must be reviewed by a secondary reviewer or manager;
It could have segregated its social content library so that posts flagged for spam don’t appear for outgoing posts;
It could have leveraged technology that previews the full post and image before publishing.