During the past 18 months or so, we have seen the emergence of innovative endpoint security solutions. The list is long; it is hard to keep track of all the solutions in the space. In no particular order, here is a sampling: Bromium, Invincea, IBM Trusteer, Cylance, Palo Alto Networks Next-Gen Endpoint Protection (Cyvera), Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET), Bit9 + Carbon Black, Confer, CounterTack Sentinel, Cybereason, CrowdStrike Falcon Host, Guidance Software Cybersecurity, Hexis HawkEye G, FireEye HX, Triumfant, Tanium, and Verdasys Digital Guardian.
I take many briefings from these types of vendors (primarily the ones I cover in Forrester’s Endpoint Visibility and Control category) and within the first 5 minutes of the conversation, the vendor mentions that their solution has a “small footprint.” The use of this phrase is the equivalent of nails scratching their way across a chalkboard for me. When was the last time you heard anyone say that they have a “large footprint?” Please provide more information: Do you run in user or kernel land? What are the impacts to utilization? Even if a vendor truly has a “small footprint,” when that new agent is deployed to a host that already has four or five agents running, the collective footprint is far from small.
We all know that securing your perimeter and your internal assets only gets you so far today. The crux of the issue is that your brand, and potential threats to it, are now often external and out of your direct area of control. The number of places and channels online where your brand appears and where malicious actors discuss how to take down your organization is expanding rapidly today.
The sharing of threat intelligence is a hot topic these days. When I do conference speeches, I typically ask how many organizations see value in sharing, and most in the room will raise their hand. Next, I ask how many organizations are actually sharing threat intelligence, and roughly 25% to 30% in the room raises their hand. When our 2014 Security Survey data comes in, I will have some empirical data to quote, but anecdotally, there seems to be more interest than action when it comes to sharing. I wrote about some of the challenges around sharing in “Four Best Practices To Maximize The Value Of Using And Sharing Threat Intelligence.” Trust is at the epicenter of sharing and just like in "Meet the Parents," you have to be in the circle of trust. You can enable sharing, but automating trust does take time.
Critical infrastructure is frequently on my mind, especially the ICS/SCADA within the energy sector. I live in Texas; oil and natural gas are big here ya'll. I'm just a short distance away from multiple natural gas drilling sites. I cannot help but think about the risks during the extraction and transport of this natural gas. North Texas has seen an attempt to bomb the natural gas infrastructure. In 2012, Anson Chi attempted to destroy an Atmos Energy pipeline in Plano, Texas. As a security and risk professional, I wonder about the potential cyber impacts an adversary with Chi's motivations could have.
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to sponsor important research in cybersecurity over the next three to five years through the Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) process. The US Federal government’s participation in cybersecurity is one of false starts. Members of each of the branches of government have made statements on the need for improved cybersecurity but very little has been done, at least in any public sense, to help the private sector deal with an onslaught of cyberattacks. At the same time, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been actively spying on private sector companies and their customers. This has sent mixed messages.
Encouragingly, the DHS is now making money available to fund research in cybersecurity with the goal of solving some of the toughest cybersecurity issues. The amount of money is small compared to the enormity of the cybersecurity problem, but it is a step in the right direction. This report will focus on what the money funds and what it means to commercial enterprises and their customers. Look for this report to publish in early August.
A few months ago I posted a blog entry entitled: "Containerization vs. Application Wrapping: The Tale Of The Tape." Well... the bout is finally over and a winner has been decided. Using a virtual tape measure, I analyzed the mobile application technology spectrum to determine which technologies are better suited to deployment in the enterprise and why. The results were about what I expected. The fight went right down to the wire and nobody scored a knockout with the winner being decided with a slim margin over the 8 rounds. Here is the judge's score card:
Business needs and requirements demand expertise and coordination for privacy programs and practices. As a result, chief privacy officers, data protection officers, and other designated privacy professionals like privacy analysts are a fast growing presence within the enterprise today. The International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) is 16,000 members strong today (compared to 7,500 back in 2010) and growing!
In many organizations, a dedicated privacy professional (e.g., a full-time employee who focuses on privacy and not someone who has privacy responsibilities attached to another role) is a new role. Privacy professionals come from a variety of backgrounds from legal to IT, and the details of their role and focus can vary depending on the organization and the size of the privacy team. Yet they all have one thing in common: they must work together with multiple privacy stakeholders – IT, security, legal, HR, marketing, and more! – across the enterprise. And honestly, it’s not always easy. Like any relationship, there are ups and downs.
Yesterday, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a third-party advisor to Target Corp. investors, recommended ousting Target’s Audit Committee because they failed to do appropriate risk management, resulting in a breach of customer data. According to Twin Cities Business Magazine, ISS stated that “… in light of the company’s significant exposure to customer credit card information and online retailing, these committees should have been aware of, and more closely monitoring, the possibility of theft of sensitive information, especially since it involves shoppers and the communities in which the company operates, as well as the overall impact on brand reputation and brand value.” This suggests a fundamental lack of understanding of both the nature of the breach and who should be held responsible for the outcome.
First, let's understand what really happened here: Target updated their point of sale (POS) systems before the holiday season. There was a known vulnerability in those POS systems that let credit card data travel between the POS system and the register before it was encrypted and sent off to the clearinghouse for approval. Target’s technology team was warned of the vulnerability and DECIDED that the risk was worth accepting – not the board, not the auditors; it was the people involved in the project who accepted the risk of losing 70 million records. When departments accept that level of risk, they in essence, end the conversation. The audit committee and board of directors would be none the wiser. When was the last time you notified your board about how you were disposing of hard drives?
On May 19, 2014, Google announced that it is acquiring containerization and dual persona vendor Divide. Divide's technology is designed to create a security and user interface division between the personal and the enterprise content, applications, and data on a single mobile device. This model meets the goal of separating the highly sensitive work data from the games and other potentially malicious content of a consumer nature. The big question is what is Google going to do now that it owns a technology leading containerizaiton play.
Selling Divide as a standalone solution isn't going to be lucrative enough, in the long term, to make the acquisition worthwhile. It makes a whole lot of sense for Google to embed Divide into the Android operating system. Just as rising tides raise all ships, containerization in Android will help the entire Android ecosystem shed the market perception of a technology that isn't quite yet enterprise appropriate. If this acquisition is any indication, Google has just put some power behind its push into the enterprise market and I don't expect it to subside any time soon.
All enterprises and vendors in the mobile security space should reconsider their future purchases and road maps based on this acquisition. Even if you are creating or buying mobile security technologies that don't play at the application layer, mobile security technologies are inseparably intertwined and this acquisition will have ripple effects that must be considered.
We recently published part 1 of a new series designed to help organizations build resiliency against targeted attacks. In the spirit of Maslow, we designed our Targeted-Attack Hierarchy Of Needs. One factor that significantly drove the tone and direction of this research was Forrester client inquiries and consulting. Many organizations were looking for a malware sandbox to check off their targeted attack/advanced persistent threat/advanced threat protection/insert buzzword needs. Malware analysis has a role in enterprise defense, but focusing exclusively on it is a myopic approach to addressing the problem.
Part 1 of the research is designed to help organizations broaden their perspective and lay the foundation for a resilient security program. Part 2 (currently writing at a non George R.R. Martin pace) will move beyond the basics and address strategies for detecting and responding to advanced adversaries. Here is a preview of the research and the six needs we identified: