Opalis Was NOT Acquired By Microsoft

The IT management software and operations communities have been buzzing this week about reports that Microsoft acquired IT process automation vendor Opalis Software. We have unequivocally confirmed that this rumor is incorrect. Opalis has NOT been acquired by Microsoft. It remains an independent entity, at least for now.

Opalis, based outside of Toronto, has repeatedly reported impressive revenue growth over its short history. For the past few years, it has been a desirable morsel for larger vendors seeking to add strong process automation to their portfolios. Many have expressed interest, but its success allows Opalis to command a high premium that no suitor has yet been willing to pay.

Some argue that Opalis actually should not be acquired at all. It has built several tight partnerships, including one with Microsoft and this rich ecosystem positions Opalis as a viable standalone vendor. Of course, this requires Opalis to continue innovating aggressively to retain its desirability and prevent commoditization. So far it has been successful at keeping its innovation edge. If it slips, so will its valuation and that will certainly accelerate an acquisition.

Process automation technology is too important for the major IT vendors to ignore and our client inquiries corroborate that the Opalis technology is well regarded in this category. Process automation is a cornerstone of advanced IT automation that conceivably enables cloud computing and automated self-service service request fulfillment. Even at a high valuation, the return on this technology will also be high.

Regardless of its stamina on the innovation treadmill, we do believe someone will eventually consume Opalis. It is premature to say who will prove to be that successful shopper. That includes Microsoft.

By Glenn O'Donnell

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CA Buys NetQoS: A New Network Management Juggernaut?

CA is a vendor that already enjoys a leading position in overall network management. Its 2005 acquisition of Concord, which brought along the assets of the previously acquired Aprisma, instantly moved CA from an also-ran to one of the clear leaders. Concord was good, and CA has an impressive track record of growing that business since the acquisition. Still, there were some weaknesses with regard to more advanced performance analysis.

On September 14, 2009, CA finally addressed these performance gaps by announcing its intent to acquire NetQoS for $200 million. Based in Austin, TX, NetQoS is one of those exciting small companies that proved there is a better approach to many of the challenges we face. It is one of the true innovators in performance management of both infrastructure and applications.

The combination of the two is a compelling proposition for network management. CA’s Spectrum is recognized as a leader in fault management, both in sheer installed base as well as technical merit. The eHealth side of the business (the original core Concord business) has been popular for performance monitoring and reporting, but the analysis from NetQoS is far superior. This is where the action now shifts in network management as well as other domains such as virtual servers, storage, and applications. The merged product line positions CA in a formidable position to capitalize on the growth areas of network management.

Network Management is a corner of the IT Management Software market that has been written off by many as boring and obsolete, yet we project that 2009 sales of network management products will be slightly less than $3.5B, or 17% of the overall IT Management Software market. This represents a 4% increase in raw spending over 2008. Granted, Forrester’s growth projection for 2009 in the broader IT management software market is 9.5%, so network management is lagging behind the overall market. Still, almost no IT spending is on the increase this year, so this is notable. Clearly, there is still demand. Network Management is hardly a dead market!

Certainly, many vendors are strong point players, but only a few can provide broad-based network monitoring and analysis for both fault and performance management, as well as configuration and change management. These powerhouses include:

• HP, which holds a longstanding leadership position centered around Network Node Manager and bolstered by the Network Automation product that came with Opsware (which it acquired with Rendition Networks).


• IBM, through the 2005 acquisition of Micromuse, gave it superb network discovery and fault management, along with a good set of performance monitoring capabilities. Prior to Micromuse, IBM’s Tivoli division was very weak in the network domain. Now it is clearly in the lead pack.


• EMC, the storage king that made its foray into the network with its 2005 Smarts acquisition. Smarts was, and still is, a phenomenal product for network fault management. In 2007, EMC added to its arsenal with the Voyence acquisition for NCCM. It still lacks a compelling performance-oriented story, but it is also among the leaders in network management.

We believe CA will augment much of its product line with NetQoS rather than replace it. There are obvious overlaps, but more opportunities to strengthen what already exists.

Is the new CA a potentially undisputed leader in network management? Possibly. The fault and performance combination is tough to beat. If a stronger network configuration and change management component existed in the CA portfolio, linked by its Unified Service Model and orchestrated by components of its Spectrum Automation Manager, the answer to the question would be a firm, “Yes.”

More importantly, the NetQoS technology promises a stronger position beyond network management. The need to gain better insight to performance, and especially application performance, is one of the most overwhelming issues still facing IT. If CA properly leverages the NetQoS portfolio, it can significantly bolster its server and application performance story. Many of the analytical algorithms extend beyond the network, so other management domains can benefit. NetQoS brings some attractive application performance management technology that should mesh with CA’s Wily product line. Here again there is some overlap that must be reconciled, although the two work in different ways and a hybrid that takes the best of both is very appealing.

NetQoS has been successful because it innovated in an area that most other vendors ignored. It is a relatively small company, but we expect it to have a big positive impact on CA and its customers.

By Glenn O'Donnell

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HP Acquires Cluster File Storage Software Vendor IBRIX

Today, HP announced that they will be acquiring the startup cluster file storage software firm IBRIX in a deal with few disclosed details. Congrats to HP for making another interesting acquisition in the clustered storage space, following their Feb. 2007 acquisition of Polyserve and their October 2008 acquisition of Lefthand. IBRIX makes software that allows users to cluster many nodes of storage (either industry standard servers or iSCSI/FC SAN arrays) for use in high performance global namespace file storage.  IBRIX’s customer base includes some 175 firms, generally in the high performance compute (HPC), video rendering/animation, and oil and gas exploration spaces.

This is an interesting move for HP who points to building share in HPC, content depot/cloud storage and archiving as key goals for this acquisition. Clearly those are high growth markets, so it’s no surprise that HP is interested in accelerating their traction there. But, it is surprising to see archiving and content depot listed as top level goals given that IBRIX doesn’t have WORM capability or object orientation. Additionally, you have to wonder what this says about Polyserve given that they were a maker of high scale global namespace file storage, and is now the basis for HP’s current cloud offering, XDS. There seems to be some overlap there, and it will be interesting to see what lines they draw to delineate use cases for customers.

Another area of concern here is the significant partnerships that IBRIX has with HP rivals EMC and Dell.  IBRIX was the original software used for EMC’s HULK scale out hardware offering before they completed the MAUI software that combined with HULK to make Atmos, EMC’s cloud storage offering. There are still a large number of users with highly complex environments that have IBRIX software mated to EMC as well as Dell hardware as back end storage; HP will have to be careful to avoid disrupting those power user customers as they develop their strategy for moving forward with IBRIX.

As with Polyserve and Lefthand, IBRIX is software only, so it makes sense for it to be owned by a major hardware player that can sell it as a comprehensive solution including hardware and services, rather than having customers cobble solutions together themselves. But, it will be tricky for HP to determine how to support existing solutions with gear from competitive vendors, how much to combine it with other software versus leaving it as a standalone product, and how it can fit with HP’s broader vision of storage.

On the positive side, HP has many back ends that could fit different types of IBRIX deployments, from Proliant servers to Lefthand iSCSI storage to EVA mid range SAN arrays, so the likelihood is that they have the right raw materials to make it work. On the negative side though, HP now has a very broad lineup of storage products, some internally developed, some acquired and some delivered through partnerships, and maintaining a consistent vision and value proposition that meet specific customer requirements may be a challenge.

By Andrew Reichman

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Configuresoft Nicely Fills an EMC Gap

EMC continues to tease the market with its management software ambitions, taking another step this week to build on its portfolio. On May 27, EMC announced its intent to acquire Configuresoft, a vendor of server configuration and change management (CCM) software. Forrester views this as a positive development for both companies but we eagerly await more.

While EMC must still make additional developmental moves to graduate into the “anchor” class of management vendors, its M&A activity has proven it is a formidable player in configuration and change management across a number of technology domains. Obviously, EMC has strength in storage, but it has also become a key vendor in the network domain with its Smarts (2005) and Voyence (2007) acquisitions, and its purchase of nLayers (2006) gives it some of the best visibility into the application domain. Servers have been a notable gap even though some good “skunk works” monitoring technology was developed within its Smarts team. Server CCM was one big domain missing from the portfolio.

This acquisition does not come as much of a surprise. The two vendors inked an OEM agreement in 2008 that resulted in EMC’s Server Configuration Manager and Configuration Analytics Manager, a re-branding of Configuresoft’s technologies. By following through with full acquisition, the bond becomes stronger and any vendor risk is much lower. The near-term actual fulfillment of the technology itself should be little changed, however. Over the next several months, EMC must continue to consolidate its many parts into a cohesive CCM strategy and integrated product family. The current tools are each very strong, but the collective suite is still fragmented.

One hopeful step in the direction of consolidation is the CMDB that EMC gained with its Infra (2008) acquisition. Many questions remain about how this CMDB strategy will play out, but EMC has the right parts to assemble into what is potentially one of the strongest CCM families in the industry. Early indications suggest the EMC people charged with this evolution are on the right philosophical track toward building a properly federated configuration management system (CMS). We implore EMC’s leadership to give them the power to execute on fulfilling this vision. This includes the freedom to build federation to third party tools, an absolute necessity to lead in the CMS market.

This consolidated CCM is notable, as the configuration and change management processes collectively form the basic core of every function performed in IT. If you do not master these, all other processes will suffer. Conversely, excellent configuration information is a catalyst toward IT excellence that must be fortified with strong analytics and change controls.

Configuresoft includes some very impressive policy analysis capabilities, a much-needed but often overlooked use case for the configuration information delivered by such products. This is one of the more promising outcomes of combining the Configuresoft, Voyence, and internally developed EMC configuration policy analysis products. It also presents a challenge to EMC, as each of these brings good but disjointed features that need to be reconciled. Will the final policy analysis engine be Configuresoft’s, Voyence’s, or something completely different, maybe a hybrid of all of these? This is a big question that does note necessarily have an easy answer.

Finally, the biggest question of them all is how EMC will parlay this CCM power into a broader, integrated management strategy. We believe the technology acquired with Smarts is a powerful asset that has not been leveraged to its potential within the EMC family. EMC missed a grand opportunity to extend more aggressively into the server and application domains for monitoring and root cause analysis (RCA). It is not too late to revisit this direction. Demand is still extremely high for application RCA. We know such RCA is far from easy, but EMC has many of the right parts to compete well if it gives this market the right attention.

To achieve this, EMC must develop or acquire performance management capabilities in the various domains, including applications. This has been a glaring hole in the EMC portfolio for years and its competitors (especially CA) have been capitalizing on this weakness. It must also present a forceful IT process automation (ITPA) capability to assemble the many CCM pieces involved. Configuresoft and Voyence are great components to this story and Infra has some decent ITPA elements, but it needs better ITPA linkages and flow automation along the lines of Opalis and the run book automation technologies acquired and developed by BMC, CA, and HP.

Forrester applauds the Configuresoft acquisition, as well as the others made by EMC’s resource management software group (RMSG). It is clear that EMC is building a truly powerful CCM story. We hope the company will get more aggressive at building atop this strong foundation. 2009 is proving to be an opportune time for M&A and EMC has some of the better potential to be a major player in IT management software. It must now prove to a skeptical market that it can execute with enough vigor to overtake the competition.

By Glenn O'Donnell

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Oracle Enhances VM Management With Virtual Iron Acquisition

The rumors are true. Oracle has finally announced that its intent to acquire Virtual Iron for its virtual server management capabilities.

It's a nice fit for Oracle, which has its own Xen-based virtualization platform called Oracle VM. Up until now, Virtual Iron has been selling its management tools on its own Xen-derived hypervisor. The net result is that Oracle gets dynamic resource management, power management, and better virtual server capabilities. And since Virtual Iron was built to manage Xen-based systems, the integration should be done by lunchtime on the day of the acquisition.

The acquisition brings up some larger questions, however, such as how Oracle will integrate Oracle VM, Oracle Enterprise Manager, and Virtual Iron Sun's xVM Server and xVM Ops Center. Now that it will supply hardware and virtualization platforms, Oracle will need to build out a stronger system management and automation portfolio.

Today Oracle's virtualization tools don't have much traction in the market when compared with VMware or Microsoft. Prior to the acquisition of Sun, I would have said it was unlikely Oracle would become a general purpose virtualization platform, with a few die-hard Oracle customers using it for their Oracle apps. Combining three Xen contenders may position Oracle as the strongest Xen player, to the detriment of Citrix. Now, it seems more likely that Oracle can become a true platform vendor -- especially if it uses virtual appliances to distribute its products. We think virtual appliances make it easier to consume operating environments that you aren't accustomed to managing. You don't have to be a Linux expert to boot a VM with a preconfigured Linux OS and Oracle running on it. If done properly with automatic updates and a web interface, you would never even have to know what was running underneath.

More information can be found on Oracle's web site: http://www.oracle.com/virtualiron/index.html

By James Staten and Galen Schreck

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Covetus The Sun Installed Base

The value of Sun’s Solaris installed base proved its worth once again this week as Oracle found it too tempting to pass up and pulled the trigger trumping IBM. A large percent of Oracle’s most profitable customers run their Oracle wares on Solaris and for them to fall further into the hands of the mortal enemy alone justifies the purchase. Sure, Oracle gains complimentary IP in Java, MySQL, and a very competent services organization but most of the rest is likely to end up off Oracle’s books.

It’s not every day that we read about a software maker buying a hardware company and that in itself is perhaps the biggest sign of things to come from this acquisition. Oracle, like Microsoft, enjoys healthy profit margins from a software-only business model. While Oracle is far more consulting-heavy than its Redmond rival, it profits rise above IBM, HP, Cisco and others because of its low cost of goods. Sun’s server and storage businesses don’t fit with this model and certainly don’t justify the further investment in the SPARC microprocessor that will be needed to keep this business healthy. So despite Oracle’s statement that, “Oracle plans to engineer and deliver an integrated system -- applications to disk -- where all the pieces fit and work together, so customers do not have to do it themselves,” expect Oracle to shop these units tout suite. Dell and HP are likely to bid for these businesses and do a strategic alignment on product collaboration like HP’s last year on the Oracle Data Warehouse.

Sun’s tape products, picked up in the StorageTek acquisition will be especially appealing, but tape has become a far less important part of the storage ecosystem than it was when Sun made its initial purchase. EMC, NetApp, and Cisco could potentially bid but are less likely suitors.

Expect Oracle to continue to invest in Unbreakable Linux, too. While this strategy was Oracle’s move to gain an OS agenda, and Solaris gives it much stronger IP position, the migration from UNIX to Linux will continue unabated. Unbreakable Linux will become more about taking from RedHat.

On the virtualization front, Oracle becomes a bit more formidable player but still with a lot of ground to gain. Both OracleVM and Sun xVM are based on the Xen open source hypervisor but are different implementations. Expect these to come together and for Sun’s virtual machine management (and enterprise management technology for that matter) to be sucked into Oracle Enterprise Manager. Oracle has taken a tough stance against any hypervisor other than their own and this will simply make them more stubborn in this regard.

What strategy should enterprise Infrastructure & operations leaders take? If you haven’t started shifting your Solaris workloads from SPARC to Intel, what are you waiting for? We recommend staying the course on your virtualization strategy. It shouldn’t take that much work for Oracle to unify xVM and OracleVM but both need lots of business development help to gain traction with the greater ecosystem surrounding VMware and Microsoft Hyper-V to justify your investment.

By James Staten

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IBM in talks to acquire Sun?

A big blue cloud overshadowed Sun’s announcement today unveiling their Open Cloud Computing platform. Media was a buzz today at rumors of a possible acquisition of Sun Microsystems by IBM. Still a rumor at this point, the story brings up many questions about how feasible this acquisition really is and if it makes sense from IBM’s perspective as well as Sun’s.

Here is Forrester’s take:

                        First and foremost this would be an acquisition based on market consolidation where a smaller vendor is acquired by a larger player, in an effort to grab a greater total share of a market where growing via margins is impossible. With Suns core business based in servers, a declining market, this seems a perfectly reasonable scenario to envision. The main value for IBM lies in the margin dollars found in the UNIX server market. IBM Global Services is one of Sun’s largest global resellers so it would be an opportunity for IBM to secure this very loyal customer base and increase its share of the UNIX market where all the margin dollars are found in the server market. Add in HP and Sun’s recent partnership around Solaris and you’ve got another big motivator for IBM to look closely at a potential acquisition of Sun to strengthen itself against the competition. Furthermore, IBM has wanted to get its hands on Java for some time as it is a key intellectual property for WebSphere and in terms of Identity & Access Management (IAM), IBM would also dominate the market from a revenue perspective with a Sun acquisition. Forrester believes a combined entity would compromise somewhere near 30% of a $2b+ IAM market. This isn’t the first time IBM has made attempts at acquiring Sun but so far all attempts have been unsuccessful. There also should be no antitrust concerns being speculated as IBM Rational alone has yearly revenue in range with Sun.

                        In terms of Sun, their growth strategy of appealing to developers through open source software — Solaris, MySQL, NetBeans, GlassFish — and hoping they will then turn to Sun for servers and storage won’t work in a global recession. The strategy depended on the rise of a new wave of Internet businesses — Web 2.0 — and expansion of Internet offerings of telcos and existing large service providers called “red shift companies”. In a global recession, neither camp is growing at the rate Sun needs it to. This makes a potential deal a possibility from Sun’s perspective.

                        Still, acquiring Sun would pose a number of integration issues for IBM Software Group. Firstly, IBM aims at executives while Sun aims at executives and beyond with a strong marketing investment towards developers. Secondly, both sides have fundamentally different business models. IBM SWG is not structurally set up to monetize support revenue stream model which they would acquire and very likely would have issues maintaining SLAs required to maintain it. Additionally, on the marketing front, a decentralized marketing model at IBM SWG would find challenges integrating a more centralized model targeted at grass roots like that of Sun. Although these challenges are not insurmountable they do offer a glimpse at several significant deterrents for IBM.

                        While IBM is the vendor which sparked the conversation, other vendors have made bids for Sun in the past and if IBM is interested it’s not out of the question to think others like Cisco and HP might counter. Regardless of the who, if Sun is acquired it should come as no surprise to see the winning bidder to shed a lot of the weaker products (and a significant number of redundant staff) in the process. From a software perspective we would expect Java, Solaris, MySQL, and Indentity Management Suite to live on with the new company with the possibility of GlassFish, NetBeans, Open ESB, and Java CAPS being spun off into open source projects if they are to continue on.
Given the current state of the market any acquisition rumor is food for thought and should be considered but this represents a deal that has just has many pros as it does cons and should be treated as such.

Thoughts on an IBM acquisition of Sun? Let us know what you think?

By James Staten

With Christian Kane, John Rymer, Jeffrey Hammond, and Stefan Reid

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Brocade Buys An Ethernet Company, Finally

The technology shift is obvious. Enterprises are increasingly networking their storage with Ethernet. If Fibre Channel lives on, it will live on as Fibre Channel over Ethernet. And like other technology domains, there is a demand for a single vendor for all networking gear. It’s one throat to choke. But what on earth took Brocade so long?

The company’s $3 billion acquisition of Foundry Networks this week has been a long time coming.

Cisco marched into the Fibre Channel switching market five years ago and has been forcing Brocade’s hand ever since. Brocade’s acquisition of rival McData was a clear example of a land grab to fend off Cisco’s increasing market share, not a step forward in evolving network technology.

Meanwhile Cisco’s leverage as the No. 1 supplier of Ethernet switches has enabled it to up-sell its Fibre Channel gear to just about every customer it could and nothing has stemmed this tide.

Finally, Brocade has made the appropriate counter move and sees the writing on the wall for Fibre Channel. But is it buying the best company?

Foundry has all but conceded the enterprise market and has been selling its switches to metro providers building Ethernet MANs. It suited Foundry’s strengths of scalability and reliability. However, as a result, for nearly two years the R&D has been focused principally on building service provider functionality.

The remaining six of the seven dwarfs in the Ethernet market are Extreme, Nortel, ProCurve, 3Com, Enterasys, and Alcatel. Why did Brocade pick a company that concedes that it has not been focused on the enterprise market? Sharing the same VC partner (Seth Neiman, a manager partner with Crosspoint Venture Partners) likely had a lot to do with it.

It might also have to do with the move towards cloud-based services, where Foundry’s gear has a solid footing within service providers, and Cisco is traditionally weak. Cloud-based services are accelerating enterprise interest in MANs. The same goes for the WAN, although that’s some two years further behind in development. It’s also likely service provides will have less of a problem buying Ethernet-based networking gear from Brocade, who has struggled to be seen as more than just a Fibre Channel networking vendor. Right now, enterprise networking teams will not buy Brocade (or Foundry) for Ethernet. Period. It’s too risky and operationally foreign. But it’s possible a more robust service provider could do it if there was a competitive angle.

Fair play to Brocade on the one throat to choke story. IT infrastructure and operations professionals are desperate for fewer vendors to deal with. And maybe one day will be able to describe this as one hand to shake. Long term it could also mean they will have a viable alternative to Cisco for end-to-end networking within the datacenter and across the enterprise worldwide.

By Jo Maitland

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Trapeze: For Sale After All, And Sold

In October of 2007 I speculated, out loud via this blog, as to whether or not WLAN infrastructure vendor Trapeze was for sale. While I don't claim to be a fortune teller (yes, RSS feeds and briefing sessions have, in large part, replaced my standard-issue analyst crystal ball) and it was no secret that the company was, at least intermittently, being shopped, it was with a bit of surprise that I greeted the news of Belden being the confirmed buyer. At $133 million in cash, there is some debate on whether the value of the transaction is consummate with the value of the goods. Given the delayed IPOs as the relatively steep slide ARUN has taken since its post-IPO high in July 2007, it's likely $133M is a fair valuation — I'll leave that question to the 'Street analysts,' you know, the analysts that still use crystal balls.

While rumored in advance of the acquisition itself, I had truly imagined a more WLAN- or at least mobility-focused vendor being the potential buyer, a late-term dark horse in the race for Trapeze. Nortel, of course, would have been a reasonable contender given their on-again, off-again WLAN gear development partnership and resales agreement with Trapeze.

I'm not as dire as some competitors of Trapeze on the news, however, I am not sure how the Belden organization will continue to foster the development and marketing of some relatively innovative WLAN infrastructure and management products (RingMaster is a product that routinely is singled as a favorite by users I speak to when discussing WLAN management products). I suppose that time will tell, however, treating the products as simply a line extension and not a separate, standalone suite upon which to continue innovating would be a shame to see.

In the short-term, the impact of this acquisition on WLAN current customers of Trapeze is not likely to be very major; products will continue to exist and the RingMaster team is a large and influential group within Trapeze — innovation here will not dry up without some missteps by Belden. Those organizations that may be mulling a move to .11n with Trapeze are likely to revisit their vendor short-lists, given what is likely to be viewed as an uncertain future for less established products, from an innovation standpoint.

By Chris Silva

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IBM Buys Diligent As Its Deduplication Anchor

On April 18^th, IBM announced its intent to acquire virtual tape library (VTL) and deduplication vendor Diligent Technologies. For IBM, Diligent is a good fit. The company offers both mainframe and open systems virtual tape libraries and they are a pioneer of deduplication. However, IBM already offers a market leading mainframe VTL based on its own intellectual property and an open systems VTL based on FalconStor technology — although the open systems VTL has very limited adoption — so there is also a lot of overlap. Because Diligent is a software solution, IBM can quickly integrate Diligent with any of its storage systems and bring new VTLs to market relatively quickly. It’s very likely that IBM will in fact pursue this route so it can bring an inline deduplicating VTL to market as quickly as possible.

The result of this acquisition? Good news for customers, who will have a choice between two open system VTLs, the FalconStor-based VTL that has much broader ecosystem interoperability and better integration with physical tape and the Diligent VTL that is focused on tape elimination. In the short-term, this will create some confusion for customers, so it’s important to know which camp you fall into — tape integration or tape elimination. You also have to fully embrace deduplication with Diligent; the technology is inline, you can’t selectively decide which backups to dedupe, and all your backups will be deduplicated. Inline deduplication isn’t right for everyone or for all backups. Also, before investing in a non-Diligent VTL, customers should ask IBM for a roadmap that shows at least one year of planned product updates.

In the long-term, IBM will try to find additional opportunities for taking advantage of Diligent’s deduplication technology, either as embedded technology or as a deduplicating gateway to any of its storage systems. This is ultimately a good thing for customers; storage capacities are growing at 50% per year, sometimes 100% per year, and most of this data is redundant and it doesn’t need to be stored on expensive, high performance storage. It would be nice to store this avalanche of data more cost effectively in the future. Customers can expect about 10-15X reduction in data using deduplication, sometimes more depending on the data set.

By Stephanie Balaouras

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