2015 was a tumultuous year for CISOs. Breaches affecting The Home Depot, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield, and T-Mobile dominated the headlines worldwide and left no industry, region, or CISO unscathed. These unfortunate spotlights created a slew of negative infosec publicity along with panicked demands from business leaders and customers alike. How secure are we? Ask the CISO. How did this breach occur? Ask the CISO. Why did this breach occur? Ask the CISO. Could we have prevented it? Ask the CISO. How could we let this happen? Ask the CISO.
Yet, CISOs continue to struggle to gain clout and influence with the rest of the C-suite and sometimes it can feel like a thankless role. There is little recognition when you’re doing your job right, but you face a whirlwind of pain and blame the second something goes wrong. The world’s growing emphasis and focus on cybersecurity should be running parallel with the capabilities and reputation of the CISO. Instead, CISOs see their responsibilities increasing with only modest funding increases, recognition, or support from their fellow colleagues.
I just published my latest research on threat intelligence: Vendor Landscape: S&R Pros Turn To Cyberthreat Intelligence Providers For Help. This report builds upon The State Of The Cyberthreat Intelligence Market research from June. In the new research, I divide the threat intelligence space into four functional areas: 1) Providers 2) Platforms 3) Enrichment 4) Integration. This research is designed to help readers navigate the crowded threat intelligence provider landscape and maximize limited investment resources. In this report, we looked at 20 vendors providing a range of tactical, operational, and strategic threat intelligence.
When developing threat intelligence capabilities, one of the most important requirements is to collect and develop your own internal intelligence. Nothing will be as relevant to you as intelligence gathered from your own environment, your own intrusions. Before you invest six figures (or more) in 3rd party threat intelligence, make sure you are investing in your internal capabilities. Relevancy is one of the most important characteristics of actionable intelligence; check out "Actionable Intelligence, Meet Terry Tate, Office Linebacker" for more details on the traits of actionable intelligence.
In the report, I use the traditional intelligence cycle as a framework to evaluate threat intelligence providers. The intelligence cycle consists of five phases:
I frequently help Forrester clients come up with shortlists for incident response services selection. Navigating the vendor landscape can be overwhelming, every vendor that has consultant services has moved or is moving into the space. This has been the case for many years, you are probably familiar with the saying: "when there is blood in the water." I take many incident response services briefings and vendors don't do the best job of differentiating themselves, the messages are so indistinguishable you could just swap logos on all the presentations.
Early next year, after the RSA Conference, I'm going to start a Forrester Wave on Incident Response services. Instead of waiting for that research to publish, I thought I'd share a few suggestions for differentiating IR providers.
What is their hourly rate? This is typically my first question; I use it as a litmus test to figure out where the vendor sits in the landscape. If the rate is around $200 you are typically dealing with a lower tier provider. Incident response is an area where you get what you pay for. You don't want to have to bring in a second firm to properly scope and respond to your adversaries.
How many cases have they worked in the previous year? You want to hire an experienced firm; you don't want to work with a consultancy that is using your intrusion to build out the framework for their immature offering. While volume alone shouldn't be the key decision point, it does give you an objective way to differentiate potential providers.
Facebook made headlines last Friday with its announcement that it had been the victim of a sophisticated security attack. All major news publications picked up the story, citing widespread concern about the implications of the breach.
The breach itself, however, was largely a nonevent from a security standpoint.
Facebook identified the security breach before it infiltrated too deeply into company systems, remediated all compromised machines, informed law enforcement, and reported the Java exploit to its parent owner Oracle – acting quickly and appropriately. Most importantly, Facebook made it clear that the breach did not expose any of its users’ data.