For years cybersecurity professionals have struggled to adequately track their detection and response capabilities. We use Mean Time to Detection/Containment/Recovery. I wanted to introduce an additional way to track your ability to detect and respond to "sophisticated" adversaries: Mean Time Before CEO Apologizes (MTBCA). Tripwire’s Tim Erlin had another amusing metric: Mean Time To Free Credit Monitoring (MTTFCM).
Here are some examples (there are countless others) that illustrate the pain associated with MTBCA:
Your CEO doesn't want to have to deliver a somber apology to your customers, just like you don't want to have to inform senior management that a "sophisticated attack" was used to compromise your environment. Some of these attacks may have very well been sophisticated but I'm always skeptical. In many cases I think sophisticated is used to deflect responsibility. For more on that check out, "The Millennium Falcon And Breach Responsibility."
Critical infrastructure is frequently on my mind, especially the ICS/SCADA within the energy sector. I live in Texas; oil and natural gas are big here ya'll. I'm just a short distance away from multiple natural gas drilling sites. I cannot help but think about the risks during the extraction and transport of this natural gas. North Texas has seen an attempt to bomb the natural gas infrastructure. In 2012, Anson Chi attempted to destroy an Atmos Energy pipeline in Plano, Texas. As a security and risk professional, I wonder about the potential cyber impacts an adversary with Chi's motivations could have.
Fifty organizations representing 95 countries were included in the data set. This included 1,367 confirmed data breaches. By comparison, last year’s report included 19 organizations and 621 confirmed data breaches.
In a significant change, Verizon expanded the analysis beyond breaches to include security incidents. As a result, this year’s dataset has 63,437 incidents. This is a great change, recognizes that incidents are about more than just data exfiltration, and also allows for security incidents like DoS attacks to be included.
The structure of the report itself has also evolved; it is no longer threat overview, actors, actions and so on. One of the drivers for this format change was an astounding discovery. Verizon found that over the past 10 years, 92% of all incidents they analyzed could be described by just nine attack patterns. The 2014 report is structured around these nine attack patterns.
Before joining Forrester, I ran my own consulting firm. No matter how ridiculous the problem or how complicated the solution, when a client would ask if I could help, I would say yes. Some people might say I was helpful, but I was in an overconfidence trap. There was always this voice in the back of my mind that would say, “How hard could it be?” Think of the havoc that kind of trap can have on a risk management program. If any part of the risk program is qualitative, and you are an overconfident person, your risk assessments will be skewed. If you are in an overconfidence trap, force yourself to estimate the extremes and imagine the scenarios where those extremes can happen. This will help you understand when you are being overconfident and allow you to find the happy medium.
Have you ever padded the budget of a project “just to be safe”? I hate to tell you this, but you are in the prudence trap. By padding the project budget, you are anticipating an unknown. Many other managers in your company may be using the same “strategy.” But the next time you do a project like this, you will pad the budget again, because the inherent uncertainty is still there. The easiest way to keep your risk management program out of the prudence trap is to never adjust your risk assessments to be “on the safe side,” There is nothing safe about using a psychological trap to predict risk.
I’m very excited to kick off survey development for upcoming Forrester Forrsights surveys that will feature security content. Continuing on from previous years will be the Forrsights Security Survey. This is an annual survey of IT security decision-makers from North American and European SMBs and enterprises. New for 2013 is a Workforce Survey that will provide the (also North American and European) employee perspective when it comes to security and devices in use within their workplace.
These surveys will be fielded April through May, and the results will make their way into published research this summer. Survey development starts now, and I would love to hear what you think about the proposed topics. What are some areas where you’d like to see us gather more data?
We have started a new report series on Cyber Threat Intelligence. The first report, "Five Steps To Build An Effective Threat Intelligence Capability," is designed to help organizations understand what threat intelligence is and how to establish a program. If you're not a Forrester client and would like the report, Proofpoint is providing a complementary copy. On Thursday March 28th, I will be conducting a Forrester webinar on the report. Please join me if you'd like to get a deeper perspective on it. In the future, we will expand on sections of this intial report with additional research including:
A collaborative report with Ed Ferrara looking at the cyber threat intelligence vendor landscape
This Forrester-moderated panel of top security executives from Allergan, Zappos and Humana will discuss the impact of scale in solving Big Security challenges. Issues from the importance of scale in detecting advanced threats to benefits to the average user will be debated. Drawing on their experiences, these experts will share their views on why scale matters in the era of big data.
David Hannigan, Zappos, Information Security Officer
Stephen Moloney, Humana Inc., Manager, Enterprise Information Security
Jerry Sto. Tomas, Allergan, Inc., Director, IS Global Information Security
Predicting what malware will look like five years from now requires more than a crystal ball. In order to fully understand future threats and challenges, you need a finger on the broader pulse of technological innovation. Our panel of esteemed experts will attempt to guide a better understanding of where we may need to target our defensive efforts in the coming months and years.
You are now no doubt aware that Boston-based security firm Bit9 suffered an alarming compromise, which resulted in attackers gaining access to code-signing certificates that were then used to sign malicious software. See Brian Kreb’s article for more details. (Symantec breathes a quiet sigh of relief to see a different security vendor in the headlines.)
The embarrassing breach comes at a time when the company has been seen as one of the security vendor landscape’s rising stars. Bit9 has actually been around for more than a decade, but the rise of targeted attacks and advanced malware has resulted in significant interest in Bit9’s technology. In late July, Bit9 secured $34.5 million in funding from Sequoia Capital. Bit9’s future was bright.
On Friday afternoon, Bit9 CEO Patrick Morley published a blog providing some initial details on the breach. A few of his comments stood out: “Due to an operational oversight within Bit9, we failed to install our own product on a handful of computers within our network … We simply did not follow the best practices we recommend to our customers by making certain our product was on all physical and virtual machines within Bit9."
Before we get too far along into 2013, I’d like to take a moment to reflect back on the events of 2012. Thanks to our friends at CyberFactors*, this is what we saw:
1,468 (publicly reported) incidents. This includes everything from stolen laptops to external hacks to third party partners mishandling data to employees accidentally disclosing data via email.
274,129,444 (known) records compromised. In the 608 cases where there was a record count reported, this was the total count.
Types of data lost/compromised
Personally identifiable information (PII) was compromised in 53% of cases. This also includes credit card or bank account information, as well as medical or health insurance information.
Company confidential information (CCI) was compromised in 4% of cases. This includes things like proprietary intellectual property (IP), compensation data, business plans, corporate financial data, and information subject to a non-disclosure agreement with a third party. These types of incidents may not always be publicly reported, assuming that organizations are even aware that it has occurred or is happening. IP is a valuable asset, and must be protected.
Governmental information was compromised in 42% of cases. This includes things like address, voting data, driver’s license numbers, state or Federal tax IDs, Social Security numbers, and passport information.
During the past three years, you may have noticed that security and risk professionals have added a new term to their lexicon – business resiliency. Is this just an attempt by vendors to rebrand business continuity (BC) and IT disaster recovery (DR) in much the same way that vendors rebranded information security as cybersecurity to make it seem sexier and to sell more of their existing products? Some of it certainly is rebranding. However, like the shift in the threat landscape from lone hackers to well-funded crime syndicates and state sponsored agents that precipitated the use of the term cybersecurity, a real shift has also taken place in BC/DR.
If you look up the term “resiliency” in the dictionary, it’s defined as “an occurrence of rebounding or springing back”. Thus, business resiliency refers to the ability of a business to spring back from a disruption to its operations. Historically, BC/DR focused on the ability of the business to recover from a disruption. Recovery implies that there was in fact a disruption, that for some period of time, business operations were unavailable, there was downtime as the business strove to recover. Resiliency, on the other hand, implies that an event may have affected the business’ operations, perhaps the business operated in a diminished state for some period of time, but operations were never completely unavailable, the business was never down.